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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
appeals, contending the district court applied the wrong standard to 
determine whether one of the alleged probation violations in his case (the failure to 
complete the sex offender treatment program) was willful. Rather than being willful, that 
failure was due to Mr. Barth's mental health issues, which prevented him from 
completing certain aspects of the particular treatment program he was in. He also 
contends the district court abused its discretion when it determined it did not have the 
authority to tailor the terms of probation to Mr. Barth's individual needs and order 
probation based on a program that would take his mental health issues into account 
when it revoked his probation. 
The State makes several arguments in response to these claims. However, 
those arguments fail to appreciate fundamental constitutional principles, controlling 
precedent, and/or the facts in the record. Because the State's responses are meritless, 
this Court should reverse the district court's finding that Mr. Barth willfully violated the 
terms of his probation by not completing the sex offender treatment and remand the 
case for a new, error-free disposition hearing. Alternatively, this Court should vacate 
the disposition order and remand this case for a new disposition under a proper 
understanding of the scope of the district court's discretion therein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Barth's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
Vvhether the 
evaluation Mr. Barth's 
willful. 
ISSUES 
wrong standard during its 
probation violations was 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided it did not have the 




The District Court Erred By Applying The Wrong Standard During Its Evaluation Of 
Mr. Barth's Claim That One Of The Alleged Probation Violations Was Not Willful 
A. Because The District Court's Decision To Revoke Mr. Barth's Probation Was 
Based In Part On Its Erroneous Determination That His Failure To Complete 
Treatment Was Willful, His Challenge To That Determination Is Not Moot 
The State contends that, because the district court found a willful violation on 
another of the alleged probation violations, Mr. Barth's challenge to the district court's 
conclusion that he had also violated his probation by failing to complete the sex offender 
treatment program is moot. (Resp. Br., pp.9-11.) The State is mistaken. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "an issue is not moot if it constitutes 
an 'actual or justiciable controversy.' Justiciable issues are controversies that are real 
and substantial and can be concluded through the grant of relief by a court." 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682 (2004) The district court's improper consideration 
of the failure to complete the sex offender treatment program in its decision to revoke 
probation is a real and substantial controversy that can be concluded through a grant of 
relief, namely, vacating that decision and remanding the case for a new, error-free 
disposition hearing. 
When considering whether to continue a defendant on probation or revoke that 
probation and execute the underlying sentence following a proved violation of probation, 
the district court is to examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
rehabilitation, such that it is continuing to protect society. See, e.g., State v. Cornelison, 
154 Idaho 793, 797 (Ct. App. 2013). The district court cannot properly evaluate that 
3 




be possible for such a to continue 
rehabilitating on probation if given an appropriate treatment option which will address 
those issues. (See, e.g., App. Br., p.22 (discussing Mr. Barth's motion to reconsider, 
wherein he presented the district court with specific information about a treatment 
program that would administer to his particular needs and issues).) When the district 
court decides to revoke probation without a proper understanding of those issues, that 
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, and Mr. Barth should be afforded the 
ordinary remedy for such an error. 
The Court of Appeals has actually addressed the question of the proper remedy 
in this type of situation before. See State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274 (Ct. App. 1995). In 
that case, as here, several probation violations were alleged against the defendant. Id. 
at 275. The defendant contended the district court erred in finding one of those 
allegations to be a violation of the terms of his probation. Id. The Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed that, "[w]hen a discretionary ruling has been tainted by legal or factual error, 
we ordinarily vacate the decision and remand the matter for a new, error-free 
discretionary determination by the trial court." Id. at 276. The only reason it did not 
apply the ordinary remedy in that particular case was that the district court expressly 
stated on the record that it would have revoked the defendant's probation on the other, 
unchallenged violations of probation. Id. at 276-77. 
In Mr. Barth's case, however, there is no such clear expression of the district 
court's intent to revoke probation based solely on the other alleged violation. In fact, it 
4 
did unchallenged allegation (the possession of paraphernalia allegation) 
the all, it on the 
sex treatment , Vol.3, p.93, 10 - 1 As such, 
is none of the evidence that existed in Upton to justify not affording Mr. Barth the 
ordinary remedy - remand for an error-free disposition. Therefore, relief is available for 
the district court's erroneous conclusion regarding whether there was a violation of one 
term of probation despite the fact that another allegation of violation was not challenged. 
That means the challenge to the district court's erroneous determination is not moot. 
Besides, "a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that 
any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged 
conviction." Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899, 900-01 (1997), abrogated on other grounds 
by Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 137 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis 
from Butler). Under this exception to the mootness doctrine, this Court should still 
consider the merits of Mr. Barth's challenge to the district court's erroneous 
determination. See, e.g., Freeman v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 138 Idaho 872, 875-76 
(Ct App. 2003). 
When this exception is in play, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that the 
party invoking the mootness doctrine bears the burden to show there is no possibility of 
collateral legal consequences. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011) ("The State 
has offered no such showing here.") abrogated on other grounds by State v. Wolfe, 158 
Idaho 55, 64-65 (2015). As in Lute, the State has offered no showing that there is no 
possibility of collateral legal consequences to an improper determination that Mr. Barth's 
5 
complete the treatment program was willful. (See generally 
1.) 
At rate, there are potential collateral consequences to the district court's 
erroneous determination, such as the possibility Mr. Barth could be denied parole based 
on the district court's erroneous characterization that he voluntarily did not participate in 
the sex offender treatment program. As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[a]n 
adverse effect on an inmate's eligibility for future parole is within the class of collateral 
legal consequences that prevents a case from being deemed moot" Lake v. Newcomb, 
140 Idaho 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2004). Additionally: 
Such consideration of an inmate's involvement in rehabilitative 
programming (or refusal to do so) is within the Commission's authority [to 
consider] and is one way to carry out the demand of section 20-223(c),[1] 
that parole 'shall be ordered when, in the discretion of the commission, it 
is in the best interests of society, and the Commission believes the 
prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law abiding citizen." 
Warren's willingness to participate in rehabilitative programs is entirely 
relevant to such an inquiry. 
Warren v. Craven, 152 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, 
there is a potential collateral consequence that could arise from the district court's 
improper determination of whether Mr. Barth willfully violated his probation by not 
completing the sex offender treatment program. As such, even if this Court determines 
the issue might be moot, this exception to the mootness doctrine applies, and so, this 
Court should still consider the merits of Mr. Barth's argument. 
1 Renumbered in 2014 as LC.§ 20-223(4). 
6 
The Record Shows That Mr. Barth's Inability To Complete The Sex Offender 
Treatment Program Was Due To His Mental Health Issues, And So, Did Not 
Constitute A Willful Decision To Not Participate In That Program 
State contends that "[t]he [Mr.] Barth's willful misconduct 
arose from his neurological issues is not ultimately relevant to the question of whether 
he willfully violated his probation." (Resp. Br., p.13.) That statement not only shows the 
State fails to appreciate all the evidence in the record about the nature of Mr. Barth's 
symptoms, but also that it fails to appreciate the controlling statutes and legal precedent 
on point. As such, its argument is wholly meritless and should be rejected by this Court. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Legislature requires the district court to consider the defendant's mental health issues 
when making sentencing decisions. I.C. §19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 
(1999). Specifically: 
if the defendant's mental condition is a significant factor, the court shall 
consider such factors as: 
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; 
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment; 
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; 
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required; 
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public if 
at large, or the absence of such risk; [and] 
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the 
time of the offense charged. 
I.C. § 19-2523(1) (emphasis added) Thus, Mr. Barth's ability to complete the sex 
offender training because of his mental health issues is one of the statutorily-identified 
7 
district court is supposed to consider in making sentencing determinations. 
1 Idaho 1 ("Idaho 19-2523 uses 
we stated that L § 19-2523 requires the trial 
defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.") Thus, the State's attempt to remove 
Mr. Barth's mental health issues from the consideration is improper. 
Furthermore, the State's argument - that it was Mr. Barth's "disciplinary issues 
and misconduct which ultimately led to his discharge" (Resp. Br., p.13) - does not 
disprove Mr. Barth's contention, supported by the various letters and reports by the 
medical professionals who evaluated him (App. Br., pp.17-19 (discussing those reports 
in detail), that those issues were caused by his mental health issues, not a willful 
decision to not participate. The most critical piece of information in the record to this 
point is the letter from Mr. Barth's treatment provider, Dr. Garner, which revealed that 
Mr. Barth was attending the treatment program and trying to participate, but that "[o]ur 
sessions have largely been consumed in deescalating Mr. Barth's anger and complaints 
and have been relatively unproductive in dealing with sexual offender treatment issues." 
(PSI, p.6.) As Dr. Beaver, who performed the neuropsychological examination 
Dr. Garner recommended (PSI, p.8), concluded, these problems were due to 
Mr. Barth's mental health issues, and that, given Mr. Barth's particular issues, the 
treatment program Dr. Garner was trying to use with Mr. Barth would not be successful; 
he would need a different, more individualized treatment program that took his mental 
health issues into account. (PSI, p.330.) 
Thus, Mr. Barth's "disciplinary issues and misconduct," as the State describes 
them, were the product of Mr. Barth's struggles with his mental health issues and the 
8 
he was asked to participate in a program which would not 
As th 
complete sex program was willful. it was 
caused by factors beyond his control, namely, his mental health issues. 
The State's Assertion That The Statutes Allow For Revocation On Nonwillful 
Violations Of The Terms Of Probation Fails To Appreciate The Relevant 
Constitutional Concerns That Are Also In Play 
The State's final argument on this issue is that, while I.C.R. 33(f) requires the 
violation to be willful before the district court can revoke probation, the statutes are not 
so narrow in scope, and therefore, under the statutes, the district court could still revoke 
Mr. Barth's probation based on a nonwillful violation. (Resp. Br., pp.13-19) That 
argument erroneously tries to read discord between the statute, the rule, and, although 
the State does not acknowledge them, the relevant underlying constitutional provisions. 
When all those provisions are considered together, it becomes clear that the language 
of I.C.R. 33(f) is actually the explanation of a harmonious reading of the relevant 
provisions. "When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way 
that results in a conflict." State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) (internal 
quotation omitted). Thus, the State's attempt to read discord into these harmonious 
provisions is meritless, especially because its reading of the statutes would render them 
unconstitutional. As such, this Court should reject the State's argument. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides: "nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U S. CONST. 
9 
XIV, Section 1. The Idaho Constitution has a similar, 
shall 
" IDAHO CONST. 
life or without due 
I, § 13. However, when assessing the deprivation of 
a liberty interest, as is the case here, Idaho applies the same standard that applies to 
the federal constitution. 2 Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768,771 (1996). 
Since probation revocation involves the loss of liberty, the probationer has a 
cognizable interest in due process during the revocation process. See 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-84 (1972). Furthermore, "[d]ue process and 
equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in these cases," where there 
is a question about whether an alleged probation violation is willful. Bearden v. 
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). Thus, based on these constitutional provisions, the 
Supreme Court held: 
[l]f the probationer has made all reasonable efforts [to meet the term of his 
probation], and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is 
fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without considering 
whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are 
available. This lack of fault provides a "substantial reaso[n] which 
justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and make[s] revocation inappropriate." 
Id. at 669 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court then compared its decision to Justice Powell's concurrence in 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 400 (1978), wherein the Justice "distinguish[ed] 
under both due process and equal protection analyses, persons who shirk their moral 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court has not addressed whether Idaho's constitution itself 
provides more protection than the federal constitution in regard to nonwillful violations of 
probation since it amended I.C.R. 33(f) in 2012. At this point, it appears Idaho's 
independent protection of those rights is the product of the Court Rules and the exercise 
of judicial review of the statutes in question. 
10 
obligation pay child from wholly unable pay." Bearden, 
"[n]umerous by 
revocation 
probation when the probationer is without fault in his failure to [comply with the terms of 
his probation]." Id. at 669 n.10. As such, the willfulness requirement in the probation 
revocation context is a product of the constitutional rights to due process and equal 
protection. 
This brings the analysis to the constitutional concerns the State ignores in 
arguing that Idaho's statutes purport to give unrestricted authority to revoke probation 
regardless of whether the violation was willful. (See Resp. Br., pp.13-19.) As the 
United States Constitution itself provides, "This Constitution ... shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."3 U.S. CONST. Art. 
VI, clause 2 (emphasis added). Thus, were the statutes to which the State points (see 
Resp. Br., pp.13-16) to be read as broadly as the State contends they should, those 
statutes would be in conflict with the due process and equal process protections 
afforded by the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution discussed supra. 
Therefore, the State's reading of the statutes would violate the fundamental authority of 
the constitutions, and so, should be rejected 
3 Idaho's Constitution has similar fundamental power: '"All the people of the State are 
bound by constitutional limitations."' Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 406 (1988) 
(quoting State v. Village of Garden City, 7 4 Idaho 513, 524 (1953)). These limitations 
apply to acts of the Legislature as well. See id. at 407. 
11 
Rather, Idaho has simply those rights and seen fit to provide 
protections constitutional floor identified Bearden. 
v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001) (discussing Idaho's ability to provide 
more protections than those afforded by the federal constitution). Initially, Idaho 
simply applied the Bearden standard in probation revocation cases See, e.g., 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct App. 1994) ("Unless the state shows that the 
violation was 'willful,' it is fundamentally unfair for the court to revoke probation without 
first considering adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are 
available."); cf. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We 
acknowledge that a judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily."). 4 However, as 
discussed in depth in the Appellant's Brief at pages 14-16, the Idaho Supreme Court 
acknowledged the amendment to I.C.R 33(f) was the product of a concern that the 
existing protections were insufficient to adequately protect the interests underlying the 
rule. (See also App. Br., Appendix A - Criminal Rules Advisory Committee Meeting 
minutes, September 16, 2011, p.6 ("This is already the law but some have been 
concerned about revocation of probation, particularly in the area of nonpayment of fines, 
without a finding that it was a willful violation, especially since no finding of ability to pay 
4 The State does, at least, acknowledge that Idaho's courts have interpreted the 
revocation statutes in this way. (See Resp. Br., p.15 (quoting State v. Sanchez, 149 
Idaho 102, 106 (2009)) ("It is true that Idaho's appellate courts have held that a trial 
court must consider alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant's 
probation based on a violation that is 'not willful, or was beyond the probationer's 
control."').) However, the State continues to argue the primacy of the statutes without 
appreciating the constitutional principles underlying those decisions. (See Resp. Br., 
pp.15-19.) 
12 
required before a fine is imposed."), see generally Resp. BL (not challenging 
on point).) 
embod amendment are 
constitutional issues originally acknowledged in Bearden and simply constitutes an 
expression of the way in which Idaho's revocation statutes can be read harmoniously 
with those constitutional provisions. This is, after all, one of the fundamental duties of 
the courts: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide the operation of each." Marbury v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) 
(emphasis added). Thus, I.C.R. 33(f) and the relevant judicial decisions reveal that the 
constitutional operation of Idaho's revocation statutes, and so, revocation of probation 
as a functional mechanism, turns on the willfulness of the violation. See, e.g., Lafferty, 
125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994). 
As a result, the rule and the statutes may be read in harmony so that the statutes 
might be given constitutional effect. That means both should be given full effect. 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974 ("When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so 
that there is no conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than in a 
way that results in conflict.") (internal quotation omitted). 
On the other hand, if this Court were to remove that critical cog as the State 
contends it should, the whole mechanism will fail to work at all. In the State's scenario, 
this Court would have to discard !.C.R. 33(f) in its entirety in favor of the revocation 
statutes. (See Resp. Br., p.15 (calling for this result).) Then, because that would allow 
13 
on nonwillful violations, which would be a fundamentally unfair 
this Court would to nullify those 
as under State's read of the statutes is 
revealed to be wholly mistaken and contrary to the most fundamental principles of law. 
After all, statutes are to be read such that "effect [is] given to all the words of the statute 
if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous or redundant." Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 897 (2011) (internal quotation omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974 (rules and statutes should not 
be read in discord when a harmonious reading is available). Therefore, the State's 
reading of the revocation statutes, which would render them unconstitutional, should be 
rejected by this Court. 
Ultimately, because Mr. Barth's inability to complete the treatment program was 
not willful, it cannot be the basis of a decision to revoke his probation. Since the record 
shows that the district court revoked Mr. Barth's probation primarily because of his 
inability to complete the treatment program (see Tr., Vol.3, p.93, L.10 - p.102, L.7), that 




The District Court's Actual Statements Reveal It Was Refusing To Consider 
Ordering A Treatment Program On Probation Tailored To Mr. Barth's Individual 
Needs, Which Is An Abuse Of Its Discretion 
The State attempts to cast the district court's comments - "To think that we could 
somehow create specialized programs for every single person based on their individual 
needs and wants is simply un -- it's unfathomable, frankly, to me." (Tr., Vol.3, p.95, L.24 
- p.96, L.3), and, "But we can't, and I don't -- I can't strap the jail, I can't strap probation 
and parole, with some type of notion that they have to do an individual plan for you 
while supervising you on probation." (Tr., Vol.3, p.96, Ls.8-13) - as merely discussing 
the potential for Mr. Barth to succeed in such programs. (Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) That 
argument is unavailing, as it is disproved by the actual language in the district court's 
statements. 
For example, the district court's comments focus on the perceived impact 
requiring such a program would have on the system writ large: "I can't strap the jail, I 
can't strap probation and parole, with some type of notion that they have to do an 
individual plan for you while supervising you on probation." (Tr., Vol.3, p.96, Ls.8-13 
(emphasis added).) Similarly, it believed that simply "creat[ing] specialized programs" 
was "unfathomable." (Tr., Vol.3, p. 95, L.24 - p.96, L.3 (emphasis added).) Thus, the 
district court's perspective was that the system would not allow it to order such an 
individually-tailored program, not that Mr. Barth could not be successful in an 
individually tailored program. 
15 
Instead, the district court took that improper perspective about the scope of its 
such programs and applied it to Mr. Barth's case 
I special for is] 
not going to work." (Tr., Vol.3, p.99, Ls.21-24 (emphasis added).) Thus, the district 
court's ultimate consideration of whether Mr. Barth could, in fact, be successful on 
probation was tainted by it erroneous determination that it could not order the necessary 
individually-tailored probation program in this case. Thus, the State's attempt to recast 
the district court's statements as merely a consideration of Mr. Barth's ability to be 
successful in such a program is disproved by the record, and so, should be rejected by 
this Court. 
Because it was unwilling to consider a probation plan that would actually address 
Mr. Barth's needs, as it was statutorily-obligated to do, the district court failed to act 
within the scope of its discretion. (See App. Br., pp.20-22 (detailing how the district 
court's decision in this regard was an abuse of its discretion). 
The State's remaining arguments on this point are unremarkable, as they all 
from its erroneous belief that the district court was trying to consider Mr. Barth's 
potential for success, rather than, as its statements actually reveal, an inability to 
formulate such a program in the first place. Accordingly, Mr. Barth simply refers the 
Court back to pages 20-22 of his Appellant's Brief. 
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The District Court's Failure To Consider The Individualized Probation Program 
Presented In Support Of The Motion To Reconsider Highlights The Abuse Of 
Discretion In Not Considering Mr. Barth's Individual Needs While Making 
State's response regarding the information M Barth presented in support of 
his motion to reconsider the decision to revoke probation is unremarkable, as it is based 
on the same erroneous points it made in regard to the initial decision to revoke 
probation discussed in Section ll(A), supra. (See Resp. Br., pp.23-24 ("The information 
attached to the I.C.R. 35 motion merely supplemented the testimony presented in 
support of the housing treatment program proposed by [Mr.] Barth at the disposition 
hearing ").) Accordingly, Mr. Barth simply refers this Court back to Section ll(A), supra, 
and page 22 of his Appellant's Brief, which discuss the impropriety of the district court's 
decision to that effect in detail. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Barth respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking his 
probation and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this pt day of December, 2015. 
~f:~~ 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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